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My aim in this paper is to explain, and begin to defend, a particular version of so-called Legal 
Moralism. ‘Legal Moralism’ picks out a family of views about the proper aims and scope of the 
criminal law according to which the justification for criminalizing a given type of conduct 
depends on the moral wrongfulness of that type of conduct. In order to explain the kind of Legal 
Moralism that I espouse, I must first distinguish some of the different versions in the literature, 
and explain why some other familiar versions of Legal Moralism are either less ambitious than I 
think we should be or, when suitably ambitious, not (as their critics have pointed out) plausible.  
 
 
1. Varieties of Legal Moralism 
 
 Two distinctions between different species of Legal Moralism matter for our present 
purposes. 
  
(a) Negative or Positive Legal Moralism? 
 First, we should distinguish negative from positive versions of Legal Moralism. Negative 
Legal Moralists hold that wrongdoing (the wrongfulness of the conduct to be criminalized) is a 
necessary condition of criminalization, but does not give us any positive reason to criminalize: 
we may not criminalize conduct unless it is wrongful; but our positive reasons for criminalizing 
it lie elsewhere, for instance in the fact that it causes or threatens to cause harm to others. By 
contrast, a positive Legal Moralist holds that the wrongfulness of a type of conduct gives us 
positive reason to criminalize it: not necessarily a conclusive reason, since we might well find 
stronger countervailing reasons arguing against criminalization; but a good reason to consider 
criminalizing it. This distinction parallels that between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ retributivism in 
penal theory. For positive retributivists the central justifying aim of a penal system is to impose 
deserved punishment: that wrongdoers deserve punishment gives us a good, if not a conclusive, 
reason to institute a system of criminal law that will impose such punishments on them. Negative 
retributivists, by contrast, hold that the positive aims of a penal system must lie in something 
other than retributive desert —for instance in the achievement of some consequential benefits. 
Retributive desert figures as a side-constraint on our pursuit of those aims, a constraint expressed 
in the principle that we must not (knowingly) punish the innocent: guilt provides no positive 
reason in favour of punishment, but innocence constitutes a conclusive reason against it.2 
 One form of negative Legal Moralism can be found in a Feinbergian version of the Harm 
Principle. The positive aim of a system of criminal law is to prevent harm, by criminalizing and 
                                                                                                                                                 
1  Grateful thanks for helpful comments are due to participants in seminars at which earlier versions of this paper 
were discussed: at the 2011 IVR World Congress in Frankfurt, at Uppsala and at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School. Special thanks to Frank Meyer, Matthew Lister and Lucia Zedner. 
2  On ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ retributivism, see Dolinko 1991: 539-43. Compare Alexander and Ferzan 2009: 7-
10, on ‘weak’, ‘moderate’ and ‘strong’ retributivism. 
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so reducing the incidence of conduct that causes or might cause harm; but the demands of justice 
set a side-constraint on our pursuit of that preventive goal, forbidding us to criminalize conduct 
that is not morally wrongful.3 A straightforward version of positive Legal Moralism is found in 
Moore’s claim that criminal law’s function is ‘is to attain retributive justice’ by punishing ‘all 
and only those who are morally culpable in the doing of some morally wrongful action’ (Moore 
1997, 33-5): on such a view, the only good reason for criminalizing a type of conduct is that it is 
morally wrongful, and therefore deserves the punishment that criminal law provides.  
 As thus described, these two versions of Legal Moralism are logically independent, since 
neither entails the other. Negative Legal Moralism does not entail positive Legal Moralism: to 
say that the absence of wrongfulness is a conclusive reason against criminalization is not to say 
that the presence of wrongfulness is any kind of reason for criminalization. Nor indeed does 
positive Legal Moralism entail negative Legal Moralism: for one could coherently hold that the 
wrongfulness of a given type of conduct is always a reason in favour of criminalizing it, whilst 
also holding that we can have other reasons to criminalizing non-wrongful conduct.4 However, 
like others who espouse positive Legal Moralism, I accept the constraint that defines negative 
Legal Moralism: we should criminalize conduct only if it is morally wrongful in some suitable 
way. Although my main focus in this paper will be on positive Legal Moralism, which is the 
more controversial and more often misunderstood species of Legal Moralism, I should therefore 
offer a brief explanation and defence of negative Legal Moralism. 
 If the moral wrongfulness of a given type of conduct is to be a necessary condition of its 
legitimate criminalization, as negative Legal Moralism holds, presumably that wrongfulness 
must be independent of the conduct’s criminalization: conduct should be criminalized only if it is 
already wrongful. It is important to note, however, that the conduct need not be wrongful 
independently of the law as a whole. If that kind of independent wrongfulness was required, we 
could still justify criminalizing so-called mala in se, which consist in conduct that is pre-legally 
wrongful; but we could not justify any of the wide range of so-called mala prohibita that are to 
be found in any modern system of criminal law: for mala prohibita are, precisely, offences 
consisting in conduct that is not (or not determinately) pre-legally wrongful; conduct which is 
wrongful only because it is legally prohibited. Indeed, the conduct that constitutes a malum 
prohibitum might not even be possible in advance of the relevant legal regulation: it is not 
possible to fail to pay my taxes, or to fail to display a tax disc in my car, if there is no tax system 
with regulations defining who must pay what, and how, or a system of regulations for road 
vehicles that creates tax discs and the requirement that they be displayed. What marks a malum 
prohibitum is that it consists in conduct that is not wrongful prior to or independently of a legal 
regulation that prohibits it. Negative Legal Moralism can justify, in principle, the criminalization 
of some mala prohibita, so long as what it specifies as a necessary condition of justified 
                                                                                                                                                 
3  See Feinberg 1984 (though it is not clear that this was how Feinberg understood the Harm Principle, since in 
his official statement of it (p. 26) what matters is not whether the conduct is wrongfully harmful, but whether 
criminalizing it will prevent wrongful harms). See also Husak 2007: 73-6. 
4  Compare the contrast between Mill’s Harm Principle, according to which the prevention of harm to others is 
the only purpose that can justify coercive measures (Mill 1859: ch. 1 para. 9), and Feinberg’s version, 
according to which the prevention of harm to others is always a good reason in favour of criminalization, which 
leaves open the possibility that we could also have other good reasons for criminalization, such as the 
prevention of grave offence or of ‘free floating’ evils that do not cause harm (see Feinberg 1984, 1985, 1988).  
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criminalization is not that the conduct be pre-legally wrongful, but that it be pre-criminally 
wrongful—wrongful prior to and independently of the law that defines it as a criminal offence: 
for it can justify the criminalization, as mala prohibita, of some breaches of legal regulations if it 
can be argued that such breaches are wrongful; and such breaches will be wrongful if the legal 
regulation in question is well designed to serve some aspect of the common good, and if the 
burden that obedience to it involves is one that citizens can properly be expected to accept as a 
matter of their civic duty. We have, surely, good reason to create a legal system of taxation, in 
order to ensure that the money required for the state to discharge its tasks is raised efficiently and 
fairly; such a system will involve regulations about, inter alia, how citizens’ tax liabilities are to 
be determined and discharged. Those regulations will not themselves (yet) be a matter of 
criminal law; they belong to the realm of tax law, not that of criminal law. But the breach of such 
legitimate regulations will be wrongful, as breach of one’s civic duty; and that wrongfulness 
suffices to meet the wrongfulness requirement that negative Legal Moralism specifies.5 
 Negative Legal Moralism as thus defined seems plausible. What is distinctive about criminal 
law is that it inflicts not just penalties, but punishments—impositions that convey a message of 
censure or condemnation;6 the convictions that precede punishment are not mere neutral findings 
of fact, that this defendant breached this legal rule, but normative judgments that this defendant 
committed a culpable wrong. The criminal law portrays crimes as wrongs; if it is to be truthful, it 
must therefore define conduct as criminal only if that conduct is, pre-criminally, wrongful.7 
 Victor Tadros offers a counter-example to negative Legal Moralism as I have defined it here. 
Suppose that we are concerned about the harm that is caused by the misuse of knives, and come 
to believe that an efficient way to reduce such harm would be to bring it about that people do not 
generally carry knives in public. We might also realize that mere exhortations not to carry knives 
will be ineffective: too many of those who might misuse knives will not be dissuaded; others, 
who might have been willing to forswear knives, will then see reason to continue to carry them 
for reasons of self-protection—and will indeed, let us suppose, do no moral wrong in continuing 
to carry them for that reason. So, for the sake of more effective dissuasion, we might then pass a 
legal regulation, prohibiting the carrying of knives in public (allowing, no doubt, certain 
exceptions for those who have good reason to carry a knife). But we will also realize that a mere 
regulation, even if backed up by some kind of administrative sanction for those found carrying 
knives, will still be inadequately effective; too many people will still carry knives; and it will 
then be morally permissible for others to carry knives as a self-defensive precaution. The only 
way to secure a substantial enough reduction in knife-carrying, we come to see, is to criminalize 
it: for only the distinctive condemnation provided by a criminal conviction, and the distinctively 
                                                                                                                                                 
5  See further Duff 2007: chs. 4.4, 7.3; contrast Husak 2005 (Husak argues that negative Legal Moralism cannot 
justify mala prohibita). The account of mala prohibita at which I gesture here clearly commits me to insisting, 
contra Bentham and those who have followed him, that the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita 
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6  See e.g. Feinberg 1970; von Hirsch 1993. 
7  There are actually two requirements of truthfulness here. One is a requirement of honesty: that legislatures 
define conduct as criminal only if they believe it to be relevantly wrongful. The other is a requirement of truth: 
that they define conduct as criminal only if it really is wrongful (compare Tadros 2007: 197-200). 
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condemnatory punishments that follow, will be effective in dissuading enough people from 
carrying knives. Now, Tadros argues, the crucial point is this. Once knife-carrying is 
criminalized, and once people in general are therefore not carrying knives, individuals lose the 
self-defensive moral permission to carry one: the threat of a knife attack from someone else is 
sufficiently reduced, and does not now warrant such a defensive measure. We can therefore say 
that, once knife-carrying is criminalized, it becomes morally wrongful. But it was not morally 
wrongful prior to its criminalization: for before it was criminalized, before its prevalence was 
thus reduced, it was morally permissible to carry a knife as a necessary measure of self-defence. 
So this, Tadros argues, is a case in which we might be justified in criminalizing a type of conduct 
as an efficient way of reducing harm, but in which the conduct to be criminalized is not wrongful 
prior to its criminalization.8  
 I am not persuaded. Let us accept for the sake of argument that it is not generally morally 
wrong, in advance of any legal prohibition, to carry knives in public. Of course, it is wrong to 
carry a knife with the intention of using it to attack persons or their property, or to carry it in a 
way that creates a clear and serious risk of harm; but merely carrying, let us suppose, is not a 
wrong, even when it is not a self-defensive measure. However, once we collectively decide to 
prohibit carrying knives, for the sake of public safety, and pass a regulation to that effect, it is 
then wrong to carry knives,9 in the sense that we—those on whom the regulation is binding —
now ought not to carry knives (the collective plural ‘we’ is important here). The necessary 
condition for criminalization specified by negative Legal Moralism, that the conduct that is to be 
criminalized be pre-criminally wrongful, is then satisfied. Of course we must also provide for a 
range of defences that should enable defendants to avert criminal liability for committing this 
offence, including self-defence: one who carries a knife because he reasonably believes this to be 
a necessary self-defensive measure will therefore be able to offer this as a defence if he is 
prosecuted. But, first, someone who carries a knife for self-defensive reasons at a time when the 
regulation is in force but is not effectively enforced is still committing what is at the least a 
presumptive wrong, which requires justification,10 and which can therefore properly be defined 
as a criminal offence, so long as the law also accepts such a justification. Second, if we attend 
not merely to the law’s definition of the offence, but to the ultimate judgment that it authorizes, it 
does not render liable to conviction and punishment any type of conduct that was not wrongful 
prior to its criminalization: for what makes a defendant liable to conviction and punishment is 
not just that he carried a knife in public, but that he did so even though this was not a necessary 
or reasonable defensive measure. That—carrying a knife in public when this is not a necessary or 
reasonable defensive measure—is the type of conduct that we have now criminalized: even if 
that conduct was not wrongful prior to or independently of the law altogether, as I supposed 
above, it become wrongful once the regulation prohibiting carrying knives is enacted; it is thus 
pre-criminally wrong, which is all that negative Legal Moralism requires.  
                                                                                                                                                 
8  Tadros 2012: 169-72; see also Tadros 2011: 323-5. 
9  Why is it now morally wrong to carry a knife? Either because the prohibition serves this aspect of the common 
good in a way that does not impose unreasonable burdens, and we should obey it for that reason; or because, 
even if it is a ‘dumb’ regulation, it is not illiberal (see Markel 2012), and can claim our obedience as a matter of 
our civic duty to respect the democratic process that produced it. I cannot discuss the latter kind of malum 
prohibitum offence, or the reasons we can have for obeying misguided laws, here.  
10  On presumptive wrongs and defenses, see Duff 2007: ch. 9. 
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 The enactment of a criminal law defining knife-carrying as an offense does play a causal role 
in the historical process given which a particular token of the type of conduct ‘carrying a knife in 
public’ becomes a token of the type of conduct ‘carrying a knife in public although it is not a 
necessary or reasonable defensive measure’, and thus becomes criminal: for, we are supposing, 
the enactment of that law brings about a change in people’s behaviour, a reduction in how many 
people carry knives; it thus brings about a relevant change in the circumstances under which this 
particular token of knife-carrying is done—a change given which carrying a knife is no longer a 
necessary or reasonable defensive measure. But what we have decided to criminalize is not a 
particular act of knife-carrying, but the type of conduct ‘carrying a knife in public although it is 
not a necessary or reasonable defensive measure’; that type of conduct is wrongful before such 
carrying is criminalized, as an unwarranted breach of the legitimate legal regulation prohibiting 
knife-carrying, even if particular tokens of public knife-carrying are wrongful only after that type 
of conduct has been criminalized. What matters for a legal moralist is not whether the wrongness 
of a particular criminal act depends, historically or contingently, on the enactment of a criminal 
law, but whether the wrongness of the type of conduct to be criminalized is logically prior to and 
independent of the law that criminalizes it; and that condition is satisfied in this case.11 
 Negative Legal Moralism is, I believe, right, but it is also inadequately ambitious; it tells us 
when we may not criminalize a type of conduct (when that type of conduct is not wrong), but not 
when we should criminalize; it specifies a conclusive reason against criminalization, but does not 
tell us what could count as a good reason for criminalization. Although it is quite natural for 
theorists, faced by the apparently irresistible tendency of governments (at least in Britain and the 
United States) to reach for criminal law as a first rather than as a last resort, to look for negative 
principles that might constrain the tide of criminalization, we must also ask about the positive 
principles that should guide decisions about the scope of the criminal law; and positive Legal 
Moralism offers just such a principle. 
 
(b) Ambitious or Modest Legal Moralism? 
 However, a second distinction must now be drawn, between ambitious and modest versions 
of positive Legal Moralism. Moore’s is an ambitious version, since he holds that every kind of 
moral wrongdoing is in principle worthy of criminalization, although other considerations, both 
principled and pragmatic, militate against criminalization many kinds of wrongdoing, so that in 
the end the criminal law’s scope might not be very different from that favoured by liberals who 
reject positive Legal Moralism.12 A modest Legal Moralism, by contrast, holds that only certain 
kinds of moral wrongdoing are even in principle worthy of criminalization; for many kinds of 
wrongdoing, the conduct’s wrongness gives us no reason at all to criminalize it. A central task 
for a modest Legal Moralist is of course then to explain which kinds of wrong are in principle 
criminalizable, and why. 
 The Legal Moralism that I favour is a modest one: the criminal law is, I believe, properly 
concerned not (even in principle) with every kind of moral wrongdoing, but only with wrongs 
that should count as ‘public’ rather than ‘private’—which at once raises the question of how we 
are to distinguish public from private wrongs (see Marshall and Duff 1998, 2010). But it is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
11  A similar point applies to the example of the spy who ought to refrain from leaking a piece of information if, 
but only if, everyone else who has the information refrains from leaking it (Tadros 2012: 168). 
12  See Moore 1997: chs. 16, 18; 2009. Note too that for Moore only wrongdoing is criminalizable. 
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positive Legal Moralism, since I believe that the distinctive function of criminal law, the function 
that marks it off from other modes of legal regulation, is its focus on wrongdoing. It aims, in its 
substantive mode, to define the range of public wrongs that the polity is to mark and condemn as 
wrongs; and, in its procedural mode, to provide for those accused of committing such wrongs to 
be called to public account for them through the criminal trial. In a liberal republic of the kind in 
which we should aspire to live, the distinctive role of the criminal law is to define those wrongs 
for which we will be publicly called to answer by our fellow citizens, and to provide the formal, 
institutional mechanisms through which we can thus be called (see Duff 2007). 
 The difference between such a modest Legal Moralism, and more ambitious Legal Moralism 
of the kind that Moore espouses, is not just one of scope: it is not that whereas Moore takes the 
whole realm of moral wrongdoing as his starting point, I would begin by carving out within that 
wide realm the particular kinds of wrongdoing that, because they properly count as ‘public’, are 
in principle of interest to the criminal law. The difference is also one in starting points. Positive 
Legal Moralism is often discussed, by both advocates and critics, as if it requires theorists and 
legislators to take wrongdoing as the starting point: we ask ourselves, as legislators or normative 
theorists, what we should criminalize; positive Legal Moralism’s first answer is ‘wrongdoing’; 
we must then survey the (extensive and highly variegated) realm of wrongdoing, to determine 
which of its species and sub-species we should at least in principle criminalize.13 Legal Moralism 
can then seem to advocate a kind of moral witch hunt: we must collectively seek out wrongdoing 
(of the appropriate kind) in order to make sure that it is criminalized and punished. That might be 
how some Legal Moralists have seen the task of criminal law: to ensure that moral wrongdoers 
suffer the retributive pains that they deserve, or that the ‘grosser forms of vice’ are persecuted, in 
order to gratify the justified ‘feeling of hatred…which the contemplation of such conduct excites 
in healthily constituted minds’ (Stephen 1874/1967: 152). But it is not, I will argue, the best way 
to make plausible sense of Legal Moralism, partly because it implies an over-simplified view of 
the criminal law as an institution that stands apart from all the other institutions and modes of 
legal regulation that make up a system of law.  
 It is indeed important to gain a clear idea of the distinctive character of criminal law, as a 
particular mode of law. It is not simply one of the mechanisms available to governments for the 
control of behaviour, to be selected if and when it is likely to be a more efficient means to 
governmental ends. Given its distinctive meaning, the first question that we must ask about its 
scope is when it is intrinsically, rather than instrumentally, appropriate to use it; and what makes 
it intrinsically appropriate does have to do with the wrongfulness of the conduct to which it is to 
be applied. However, it is also important to remember that the criminal law is not simply the 
moral law given institutional form. It is a part of the political structure of the state—a part of our 
political or civic lives rather than of our more personal moral lives; its proper aims and role must 
be understood in that context, in terms of the contribution it makes, or should make, to that 
dimension of our lives.14 This is not to say that it must be understood in political rather than in 
                                                                                                                                                 
13  On any plausible version of Legal Moralism, the question of whether we should in the end criminalize, all 
things considered, is a much more complicated question, of both principle and practicality. 
14  Compare Thorburn 2008, 2011, on criminal law’s ‘public’ character: even if one does not accept his particular 
account of its role, he is right to focus on its place within the political structure of the state. Also relevant here 
is the German idea of criminal law as ultima ratio or a last resort, and the related principle (or slogan) that it 
has an essentially ‘fragmentary’ and ‘subsidiary’ character: for a very helpful discussion, see Jareborg 2005.  
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moral terms, as if the political and the moral are separate realms. It is still to be understood as an 
institution that is concerned with moral wrongdoing, and that aims to communicate in morally 
appropriate ways about such wrongdoing; but its concern is with wrongdoing that figures in the 
public realm of our political or civic life—not with moral wrongdoing as such (whatever that 
might mean).  
 We could put the point this way. To say that criminal law is concerned with ‘public’ wrongs 
is not to say that theorists or legislators who are thinking about criminalization should begin with 
the general category of wrongs, and then try to identify within that category the subcategory of 
wrongs that are ‘public’. Rather, we begin with the idea of the public—the res publica, the realm 
of our civic or political life; as we think about how to organise and regulate that realm, we will 
find a role for a system of criminal law as an appropriate way in which we can mark and respond 
to wrongs committed within it; but such wrongs come into consideration as already being public 
wrongs. We must indeed, any polity must, work out a distinction (or set of distinctions) between 
the public and the private realms—between those aspects of citizens’ lives which belong to the 
civic enterprise of living together as a polity, which are therefore of legitimate interest to their 
fellow citizens in virtue simply of their citizenship; and those aspects that fall instead within the 
various non-political, non-civic, spheres of the citizens’ lives. That distinction will then generate 
a distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ wrongs—between the wrongs that could in principle 
fall within the reach of the criminal law, and wrongs that are in principle not the law’s business. 
But this distinction between public and private wrongs itself flows from a more fundamental 
distinction between the public and the private realms, since a public wrong is simply a wrong 
committed within the public realm; any adequate normative account of the proper scope of the 
criminal law must therefore begin, not with wrongs as such, nor even with public wrongs, but 
with the public realm.15 
 I will try to explain this view, and render it plausible in the rest of this paper. To that end, it 
will be useful to think about criminalization not simply as an act, for instance of legislation, but 
as a process, or rather a series of processes. 
 
 
2. Processes of Criminalization 
 
The processes of criminalization are those processes through which conduct comes to be or to be 
treated as criminal. My concern here is not with how those processes actually operate (that would 
be a complicated, messy, often depressing story, based on historical, sociological, psychological 
and political evidence), but with how they should operate: with what considerations should guide 
people in deliberating over whether to criminalize or not; and in particular, how—at what stages, 
in what ways—considerations about the moral wrongfulness of potentially criminalizable types 
of conduct should figure in such deliberations. More precisely still, my concern is with the logic 
rather than with the chronology of criminalization processes: not with the ways in which or times 
at which such considerations are actually adverted to in deliberations about criminalization, but 
with the proper logical structure of the deliberations that could justify criminalization. 
                                                                                                                                                 
15  As might be evident, I think that the republican tradition provides the best grounding for an account of the civic 
enterprise: see e.g. Dagger 1997; Pettit 1999. But my argument here is that any account of the proper scope of 
the criminal law must be grounded in a political theory of some kind, whether or not its spirit is republican. 
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 The most salient criminalization process is legislation: a type of conduct is criminalized by 
the enactment of a statute defining it as criminal; the process of criminalization is the process 
through which the statute came to be enacted.16 That process includes the deliberations of policy 
makers, civil servants and legislators as they think about whether to introduce a new statute, 
what it should cover and how it should be worded; it can also include various earlier processes of 
deliberation and argument by, for instance, law reform bodies, pressure groups and campaigners, 
and so on. For simplicity’s sake I will focus here on governmental or official deliberations, by 
policy makers, law commissions and the like. We must also note, however, that criminalization 
involves other processes than this. 
 The enactment of a new criminal statute, defining as criminal conduct that was not until then 
criminal, constitutes criminalization ‘in the books’:17 the statute is now in the books; the criminal 
code, if there is one, includes this new offence; those who engage in that conduct are formally 
liable to be prosecuted, convicted and punished. Whether they are, and how many of them are, 
actually prosecuted, convicted or punished, however, depends on the decisions of other actors 
related to the criminal justice system, who help to determine what is treated as criminal ‘on the 
streets’. The police must decide which crimes to investigate, and what resources to devote to 
their investigation; which cases to refer to the prosecutor, which to dispose of in other (often 
informal) ways. Prosecutors must decide which cases to pursue as criminal cases, and which to 
drop, or to divert from the criminal process. A key question here is how far prosecutors should 
observe a ‘legality principle’ requiring them to prosecute whenever there is sufficient evidence to 
do so;18 or how far should they also attend to ‘the public interest’ in deciding whether or not to 
prosecute?19 Both police and prosecutors will make many such decisions on a more or less ad 
hoc, case by case basis; but they might also adopt policies identifying kinds of case in which, or 
factors given which, they will or will not generally take a case through as a criminal case. When 
a policy is adopted of not prosecuting in certain specified types of case, it could be argued that in 
such cases the conduct is now effectively decriminalized: it is, as a matter of official policy, no 
longer treated as criminal; if a prosecutor pursued a case, the court might dismiss the prosecution 
as an abuse of process.20 Judges, especially in the appellate courts, also play an obvious role in 
criminalization processes: their interpretations of the laws that they must apply help determine 
what kinds of conduct are counted as criminal.21 If a legal system includes lay participants in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
16  This is not to deny the importance of judicial development and creation of criminal law, especially in common 
law countries. We should also bear in mind the extent to which the power to legislate, and to criminalize, can 
be delegated from parliament to other official bodies. 
17  Sometimes a criminal statute does not bring new conduct within the reach of the criminal law, but defines some 
already criminal type of conduct as a new, distinct offence: see Husak 2007: 36-8. 
18  On the legality principle and its operations in different European jurisdictions, see e.g. Tak 2009; Kyprianou 
2008: ch. 2. We cannot discuss here the extent to which that principle is actually obeyed in the jurisdictions in 
which it officially obtains. 
19  See Rogers 2006; Ashworth and Redmayne 2010: 204-6; Crown Prosecution Service 2010a: 10-15. 
20  For a good example see Crown Prosecution Service 2010b, specifying the factors that would guide decisions 
about whether to prosecute those who helped others to travel to the Dignitas clinic.  
21  For a very straightforward example from England, see R [1992] 1 AC 599, holding intra-marital rape to be 
criminal, although it had been clear until that case that, in the law’s eyes, a man could not rape his wife. A 
striking feature was the lack of protest about such judicial, and retrospective, expansion of the criminal law.  
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criminal process as arbiters of guilt or innocence, for instance as jurors or as lay magistrates, they 
too can play a significant role, given their effective power to nullify the law by acquitting 
defendants who are clearly, in law, guilty as charged.22 
 Nor should we ignore the role played in the processes of criminalization by a variety of non-
state actors, particularly those who find themselves with the power to treat some type of conduct 
to which they have been subjected, or which they have witnessed, or indeed which they have 
themselves committed, as criminal by informing the police, or not to do so. Supermarkets, for 
instance, must decide whether to report shoplifters to the police for prosecution, or deal with 
shoplifting in other ways; businesses must decide whether to treat minor pilfering by employees 
as criminal theft, by involving the police, or as an ‘internal’ matter (or to ignore it). Individuals 
often have a similar power: if I suffer some harm at another’s culpable hands, I might respond by 
calling the police and reporting it as a crime; or I might decide to ignore it; or I might pursue the 
matter by other means (by a civil suit for damages; by an attempt at informal mediation ....): it is 
often in effect, if not in law, up to me to make it a criminal, or a non-criminal matter by the way I 
choose to respond. In such cases, as in cases of jury nullification, we are of course dealing not 
with a change in legal rules or doctrines, but with whether or not individual actions are treated as 
criminal; but they are still relevant as processes through which conduct is, or is not, effectively 
criminalized. If we are going to work towards an adequate account of criminalization—if not of 
what conduct should be criminalized, at least of the kinds of consideration that should determine 
decisions about what to criminalize—we need to attend to these kinds of criminalization decision 
as well. 
 These are some of the processes through which conduct can come to be, and can come to be 
treated as, criminal, or as non-criminal. In each of these cases, we must ask what kinds of factor 
should figure in the agents’ deliberations, and how they should figure, as reasons for or against 
criminalizing the conduct or treating it as criminal. I will have time in what follows to discuss 
only the processes that result in formal legislation—in the enactment of new criminal statutes; 
but we can hope that this will throw some light on the other processes noted here. 
 
 
3. Criminalization and Wrongdoing 
 
Processes of criminalization do not arise from nowhere: they begin in response to a perceived 
problem. We see some state of affairs Φ, actual or prospective, as problematic; and we come to 
consider criminalization as a way of dealing with or responding to Φ.23 So to ask about the 
legitimate processes of criminalization is to ask what kinds of Φ, or what lines of deliberation 
about how to deal with or respond to Φ, could properly lead us to see criminalization as an at 
least in principle appropriate option. 
                                                                                                                                                 
22  This is not the place to debate the proper role (if any) of jury nullification in a democratic criminal law (see, 
e.g., Hreno 2007; Rubenstein 2006. Also worth considering are cases in which English lay magistrates 
acquitted peace demonstrators who caused symbolic damage to American fighter planes in protest at the Iraq 
war: the demonstrators pleaded the necessity of stopping an illegal war—a kind of plea that had been firmly 
and formally rejected by the House of Lords (Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763). 
23  Whether ‘we’ are politicians, or civil servants, or members of a law reform body, or concerned citizens, when 
we think about criminalization we must be thinking in political terms, of what the polity should do. 
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 To illustrate this, consider a simple version of ambitious, positive Legal Moralism.24 On this 
view, criminalization enters the frame if and only if Φ consists in moral wrongdoing of some 
kind, and we think of criminalization because such wrongdoing deserves punishment, which it is 
the criminal law’s function to provide. I will argue that we should indeed think of criminalization 
only when and because moral wrongdoing appears: but first, Φ need not itself involve any moral 
wrongdoing to serve as the starting point of a deliberative process that leads to criminalization; 
second, not all kinds of moral wrongdoing makes criminalization even in principle appropriate; 
and third, the proper reason for criminalizing conduct is not (or not simply or merely) to ensure 
that it is punished as it deserves. These points should become clear in what follows. 
 Consider next, by way of sharp contrast, a simple instrumentalist view, according to which 
the question we ask is simply: what will be the most cost-effective way of dealing with Φ? On 
such a view, Φ is problematic because it impairs or threatens a good (for instance, for utilitarians, 
happiness); we have reason to use the criminal law as part of our method of dealing with Φ if and 
only if we can expect that to be (part of) an efficient way of minimising the evil that Φ causes, or 
of protecting or restoring the good that it threatens. We will, of course, need to determine what 
distinctive contribution the criminal law can make: what beneficial effects it can produce at what 
cost, as compared to other available mechanisms. But the criminal law is one technique among 
others: we cannot ask whether it is intrinsically (in)appropriate in dealing with Φ, since for the 
instrumentalist cost-effectiveness in producing valued outcomes is all that matters. It would be 
absurd to deny that instrumentalist considerations are relevant to criminalization: attention to the 
likely effects of criminalizing (or of not criminalizing), and of this or that particular mode of 
criminalization, is crucial to final decisions about whether, and how, to criminalize. But such 
considerations are not the whole story, and should not figure in the initial stages of deliberation: 
our first questions must rather be about whether criminal law is intrinsically apt as a part of our 
response to Φ; whether such a response is suitable or appropriate to the character of the problem 
that it is supposed to address. What makes criminal law thus intrinsically apt, I will argue, is the 
wrongfulness of the conduct to be criminalized. 
 Whilst those must be our first questions about criminalization as a specific mode of legal 
regulation, they will often not be the first questions on the road that ultimately leads towards 
criminalization. Our first question in practical deliberation might simply be some version of 
‘What are we to do about Φ?’; and Φ, as a problem about which we must do something, will 
often not appear in the guise of wrongdoing to which criminalization is a possible response. We 
might indeed begin simply with the thought of Φ as something untoward—undesirable, harmful 
or dangerous. But if such a thought is to initiate practical deliberation, to move us to action, it 
must become the thought of Φ as a matter about which something could, and should, be done. 
That thought might initially be expressed in a passive, impersonal voice —‘Something should be 
done about Φ’; but that is not yet apt to initiate practical deliberation. It implies that there is an 
unspecified ‘they’ who should do something about Φ, but also that it is not our business; we 
speak as detached, sympathetic, observers rather than responsible agents.25 For deliberation to 
                                                                                                                                                 
24  Compare Moore’s account of the proper function of criminal law (Moore 1997, 2009)—though I do not try to 
capture the complexity of his view here. 
25  That is one reason why the notorious remark by the soon to abdicate Edward VIII that ‘something must be 
done’ for the unemployed miners he met in Wales was crass: it distanced him from any responsibility for 
helping them—hardly an appropriate attitude for someone presenting himself as their king. 
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begin, ‘Something should be done’ must turn into ‘We should do something’, and that transition 
is not merely grammatical: it involves an acceptance (or a claim) of responsibility, that Φ is our 
business; and such responsibility ascriptions, to ourselves or to others, can be problematic. That 
transition can reflect a proper realisation that what we had previously observed from a detached 
stance is our business—that, for instance, the suffering of those afflicted by starvation elsewhere 
in the world is our business, and that we should do something about it.26 But it can also reflect a 
more arguable claim that Φ is our business—a claim that others, including those on whom Φ 
most directly impinges, might deny.  
 Suppose for instance that I deplore my students’ choice of newspapers: instead of reading 
quality broadsheets, they corrupt their minds by reading tabloids whose journalistic standards 
and aims are, to put it mildly, low. If I suggest that ‘we’, the university, should do something 
about this, for instance by offering guidance on which papers are worth reading, or allowing only 
certain papers to be sold on campus, I might be accused by both my students and my colleagues 
of interfering in something that is not my, or our collective, academic business; to sustain my 
claim that ‘we should do something about it’ I must argue not merely that it would be a good 
thing if students read better quality newspapers, but that improving their habits in this respect is 
part of what the university should be doing in educating them. I do not say that this could not be 
argued; but my point is that the transition from ‘Something should be done about Φ’ to ‘We 
should do something about Φ’ is mediated by the claim that Φ is our business—a claim which 
might be controversial. 
 To determine whether a university should seek to guide its students’ newspaper choices, we 
must articulate a conception of what universities are for: what belongs to, what falls within, the 
academic enterprise of educating students and pursuing research? Similarly, when the ‘we’ who 
are to ‘do something’ is a polity, or a government acting on a polity’s behalf, the claim that Φ is 
our business must be grounded in some conception of the res publica—of just what the polity’s 
enterprise, the civic enterprise of living together as citizens, includes; and some familiar battles 
between liberals and their opponents (and among those who call themselves liberals) about the 
proper scope of the criminal law reflect competing conceptions of the res publica. I will not 
engage with those debates here: but we must remember their relevance, and that of the debates in 
political theory from which they flow, to questions about criminalization, and to other questions 
about what (if anything) we should do collectively, as a polity, about various kinds of Φ that we 
find problematic or disturbing. 
 Which kinds of Φ, about which we think we should do something, might lead us to think of 
criminalization as part of that something? The simple answer to this question is that there is no 
simple answer. There is no single kind of starting point from which we are properly led towards 
criminalization, no single route to that end; there are, as I will illustrate shortly, a number of 
different starting points and different possible routes. However, I will suggest, any legitimate 
route towards criminalization must pass through three gates:27 the conduct to be criminalized 
must be wrongful; it must require a collective response; and we must have good reason to make 
its wrongfulness salient in that collective response. 
                                                                                                                                                 
26  I leave aside here the question of whether that realisation is grounded simply in the fact that we are able, 
collectively, to do something without incurring unreasonable costs, or also partly in the fact that we share in the 
causal responsibility for their present suffering. 
27  Compare Schonsheck 1994, on the ‘filters’ through which arguments for criminalization must pass. 
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 One kind route towards criminalization begins with simple kinds of harm: with damage, or 
the threat of damage, to interests that it is, on any plausible conception of the res publica, the 
business of the polity to protect. We come to realise, for instance, how harmful smoking is, to 
smokers and to others around them, and how addictive nicotine is; or how dangerously driving 
competence is impaired by drinking alcohol; or how dangerous certain manufacturing processes 
are to those engaged in them; or how HIV can be transmitted by unprotected sexual intercourse. 
‘We should do something about it’—but what? Given confirmation that the risks are real, and 
sufficiently serious, our first strategy might plausibly be one of information and encouragement: 
the government, or its health and safety agencies, mount campaigns to make clear the dangers 
involved, and how they can be reduced—by refraining from the dangerous activity altogether (by 
giving up smoking), or by taking suitable precautions when engaging in it. Such warnings and 
advice are likely, however, to be ineffective: too many people will be unmoved by them; the 
risks, and the harms that ensue when those risks are actualised, will continue at a level that we 
regard as unacceptable. We might then think about doing more, in particular of using the law—
but what more, and to what end? 
 It is here that advocates of Mill’s, as distinct from Feinberg’s,28 Harm Principle should first 
be concerned, before there is any question of criminalizing anything. So long as what we do is 
limited to ‘remonstrating’, ‘reasoning’, ‘persuading’, or ‘entreating’ people not to engage in such 
risky activities, or to take precautions when doing so, the Harm Principle is silent; but as soon as 
we exercise any kind of ‘compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in 
the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion’, we must ensure that we do 
so only ‘to prevent harm to others’ (Mill 1859: ch. 1, para. 9). I will not discuss the plausibility 
of this restrictive doctrine here, since my concern is with the question of when and why, once we 
consider some kind of legal regulation, we should then think of involving the criminal law. 
 There are plenty of ways, other than criminalization, in which we could mobilise the law in 
our efforts to control such dangers. We could make the dangerous activity harder or more costly 
to engage in, for instance by taxation; we could require those engaging in it to obtain a licence, to 
secure which they need to demonstrate their competence; we could make provision for those who 
are harmed or endangered to bring civil cases for damages or compensation; or we could (which 
will bring us closer towards criminalization) create a regime of regulations specifying the various 
kinds of precaution that those engaging in the activity should take; we could even, if we could 
see no tolerably safe way of regulating the activity, and also see its value as insufficient to make 
it reasonable to take, and accept, the risks it creates, prohibit the activity altogether. But we are 
not yet talking of criminalization. However, once we think of regulating, or prohibiting, the 
activity, we must ask how we should deal with breaches of the regulations, or with those who 
still engage in the activity. Now we might wonder about using the criminal law—about making 
such breaches criminal. But what could give us good reason to think in such terms? 
 There are, I suggest, three conditions that must be satisfied if we are to have good reason, in 
principle, to criminalize.29  
                                                                                                                                                 
28  See n. 4 above. 
29  I do not have space here to compare the approach taken here with that taken in Husak 2007, which looks for 
constraints on criminalization, and has little to say about the ‘substantial state interests’ that could generate 
positive reasons for criminalization; or with that taken in Simester and von Hirsch 2011, which specifies both 
wrongfulness and harm as criteria of legitimate criminalization. 
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 First, the criminalizable conduct must be morally wrong:30 for the criminal law condemns 
and censures, and such condemnation and censure must, as a matter of justice, be directed at 
wrongful conduct and its culpable agent. We can note three ways in which this condition may be 
satisfied. Some kinds of risk-creation are so obviously pre-legally wrongful, in subjecting others 
to manifestly unreasonable risks of harm, as to be eligible for criminalization in advance of any 
particular regime of legal regulation; we have good (albeit not necessarily conclusive) reason to 
criminalize them when they actually cause harm,31 and when the harm does not in fact ensue.32 
In other cases, the risk created might not be so obvious, or so obviously serious, or so obviously 
one that it is not reasonable to expect others to accept. In such cases, it would be unjust to make 
the conduct criminal, thus making those engaging in it liable to public censure and punishment, 
without giving them fair warning that it would attract such a response: that is one reason why, in 
cases such as smoking, or drinking and driving, or HIV-transmission, if criminalization is to be 
justifiable at all it must follow a campaign of public education which seeks to make clear that 
and why the conduct in question is dangerous and therefore wrong. Finally, in yet other cases, 
we might think that the only efficient way to reduce the risks to a tolerable level is to introduce 
regulations prohibiting a wide category of conduct that includes both actually dangerous conduct 
and conduct that might not itself be dangerous: this is, for instance, why our driving regulations 
include not only a requirement to drive safely, but also a requirement to obey the speed limits—
although we know that exceeding the speed limit is not always dangerous. In this kind of case, 
the wrongfulness of conduct that violates the regulation lies not necessarily in any actual danger 
that it creates (for it might not be dangerous), but in the violation of a justified legal rule that 
serves public safety.33 
 Second, the wrongful conduct must require, or make appropriate, a collective response: it 
should not be left to the individuals directly affected by it to deal with it, for instance through a 
civil suit for damages or compensation for any harm they have suffered. This is one central 
difference between a criminal law and a civil law method of dealing with wrongful harms. A 
criminal law response is a collective response by the whole political community, which takes 
over, or some would say ‘steals’, the wrong from its direct, individual victims (when there are 
any).34 By contrast, a civil law response remains in the hands, under the control, of the victim —
the person who claims to have been wrongfully harmed or endangered. We can collectively 
support victims in bringing civil suits, but we leave it to them to decide whether to pursue the 
issue or not. A criminal case is our collective case; whether and how it is pursued is a public, not 
a private matter. We could have various reasons for treating the wrong in this way as a public 
matter that merits a collective response. Perhaps there is no individual victim to bring a civil 
case: the risk affects the public generally, rather than identifiable individuals. Or perhaps we 
think it important to deal systematically with this kind of conduct, rather than leaving it to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
30  It must indeed be a public wrong, which concerns us all as citizens: but since we have got this far only because 
the matter in hand is a public matter, wrongs related to it will also be public wrongs. 
31  As with offences of recklessly causing either physical harm to the person or damage to property: see e.g. 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 20; Criminal Damage Act 1971, s. 1. 
32  As with the Model Penal Code offences of reckless endangerment in §§ 211.2, 220.1. 
33  On this kind of malum prohibitum offence, see Husak 2007: 73-6, 103-19; Simester and von Hirsch 2011: 24-9; 
Duff 2007: 89-93, 166-74. 
34  See Marshall and Duff 1998; on ‘stealing’, see Christie 1977. 
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vagaries of individual victims’ choices whether each instance attracts a legal response. Or we 
might think it is unreasonably burdensome to expect the individual victims to pursue the case—
that we owe it to them to take on the burden as a collective responsibility. Or our reasons might 
relate to the third condition, to be discussed next: that we should make the conduct’s 
wrongfulness salient in our response, as something that needs to be collectively marked and 
censured.35 
 The satisfaction of the first two conditions does not yet bring us to criminalization. We now 
have a reason to criminalize: we have conduct that constitutes a public wrong (wrongful conduct 
directly related to a matter that is our collective business), which is therefore in principle apt for 
criminalization. But we must now ask whether our collective response should make this feature, 
the wrongfulness, salient. That is what criminal law does: it defines conduct as a public wrong, 
and provides for a response, the criminal process of trial and punishment, which focuses on the 
wrong as something for which the perpetrator is to be called to public account, on pain of formal 
censure and punishment if he cannot provide an exculpatory explanation of his actions. Such a 
response is appropriate to public wrongs: it takes the wrong seriously, and thus does justice to 
the victim (if there is one) as someone who has been not just harmed, but wronged; it takes the 
perpetrator seriously as a responsible citizen who can be held to account by his fellows; and it 
displays our commitment to the values that the wrong violated. But it cannot be an unqualifiedly 
absolute demand that we respond in this way to all public wrongs, whatever the cost of doing so: 
the polity has other values, other goals, which may sometimes conflict with, and may sometimes 
outweigh, the reasons we have for responding to public wrongs as wrongs whose perpetrators 
must be called to public account, censured, and punished.36 We should also, to give just a few 
examples, be concerned with preventing future harms and wrongs; with repairing harm that has 
already been caused; with preserving or restoring civic relationships. A proper criminal process 
of calling to account can serve such ends (see Duff 2001), but it can also conflict with them: we 
will sometimes do better to focus on repairing harm, or dissuading risky conduct, or resolving 
conflicts, rather than calling wrongdoers to account. 
 This is another reason why the Legal Moralism advocated here is a modest one: it does not 
demand even that all public wrongs must be criminalized; it holds only that we have reason to 
criminalize them, whilst recognising that we might have weightier countervailing reasons either 
for doing nothing formally, or for preferring legal mechanisms other than that of criminalization. 
This is not to fall back into an instrumentalist approach that would favour criminalization if and 
only if it is likely to be the most efficient among those available to us to produce independently 
specifiable social goods: criminalization is an intrinsically appropriate response to public wrongs 
in that it takes the wrongs, and their victims and perpetrators, seriously. Such wrongs, especially 
if they are egregious, make a categorical, non-instrumental demand on our attention—a demand 
that criminalization can satisfy (see Jareborg 2005: 534). But categorical demands are not always 
absolute demands, and they must compete with other kinds of demand for our attention and our 
resources. 
                                                                                                                                                 
35  This raises, of course, a host of issues about the distinctions between the criminal law and other kinds of law, 
notably tort law, which we cannot pursue here: see e.g. Honoré 1995; Goldberg and Zipursky 2010; Gardner 
2012. 
36  Some of these issues are illustrated by debates about the criminalization of reckless HIV-transmission: see 
Chalmers 2002. 
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 I have focused so far on a route towards criminalization which lies close to that implied by a 
Feinbergian Harm Principle: we have reason to criminalize conduct when it wrongfully harms or 
threatens an interest that the polity should protect. But the structure of practical reasoning that is 
exemplified in this context is not limited to contexts in which the Φ that motivates deliberation 
about what we should do consists in Feinbergian harm: other starting points, and other routes to 
criminalization, are possible, some more direct (because wrongfulness appears earlier) than the 
route that starts with harm. I have space here only to note some of these possibilities; a central 
task for any would-be theory of criminalization will be to explore others. 
 The route discussed above began with harms that are detachable not merely from wrongful 
conduct, but from human conduct altogether—harms that could be caused by human action, but 
also by natural processes;37 we begin on the road to criminalization when we focus on the ways 
in which they can be caused by human conduct that is wrongful either because it is dangerous or 
because it violates a regulation that serves public safety. Sometimes, however, we begin with a 
wrongful harm: with a harm that cannot be understood independently of the wrongful human 
action that produces it. This is a feature of such central mala in se crimes as murder, rape, and 
burglary, and other crimes that involve attack on protected interests:38 they typically involve 
serious or potentially serious harms, but the character of those harms is determined in crucial part 
by the wrongful character of the attacks that produce them. In these cases the initial reason for 
criminalization comes into view straight away, as soon as we recognise the harmful wrong as a 
public wrong.39 It is also usually a stronger reason: because the harm that concerns us is partly 
constituted by the wrongfulness of the conduct, an adequate response to that harm will need also 
to take account of, to make salient, the wrong. 
 In other kinds of case, we begin not so much with a concern to prevent harm (at least to any 
concrete interests), as with a concern to maintain the institutions and practices on which the 
functioning of the civic enterprise and the common good depend. Those institutions might of 
course have to do with harm-prevention: this is true, for instance, of the whole apparatus of 
health and safety regulation, of many driving regulations, not to mention defence, health care and 
social welfare provisions. But we will also recognise a need for regulations that serve not so 
much directly to prevent the kinds of harm with which the institutions are concerned, as to 
ensure the functioning of the institutions themselves: regulations concerning various kinds of 
license provide one obvious kind of example here; tax regulations provide another. We have to 
ask again how we should respond to, or dissuade, breaches of such regulations; and we will have 
reason to criminalize such breaches if, and only if, they constitute public wrongs that merit or 
require a formal, collective response that condemns the wrong and calls the wrongdoer to public 
account. 
 In yet other cases, harm plays an even less central role in our starting point: what strikes us is 
the wrongfulness of a certain kind of conduct; although it might also be a source of harm (partly 
in virtue of people’s reactions to it), our thought that ‘we must do something’ is motivated by the 
wrong rather than by the possible consequential harm. I take this to be true, in different ways, of 
                                                                                                                                                 
37  Compare Feinberg’s account of a ‘harmed condition’ (1984: 31-6). 
38  See further Duff 2007: 126-30, 147-58. 
39  Even here we must begin, therefore, not with wrongfulness as such, but with a conception of the public realm. 
But since the public realm is specified partly in terms of the values which structure the civic enterprise, wrongs 
that violate those values cannot but be seen ab initio as public wrongs. 
 16 
‘extreme’ pornography that graphically depicts the humiliation or torture of members of one sex 
or group as a source of sexual gratification for readers or viewers; and of certain kinds of racist 
or otherwise discriminatory insult, especially if they are directed against members of an already 
disadvantaged or vulnerable group, which violently deny their fellow membership of the polity. 
What makes it plausible to see these as public wrongs (even when, in the case of pornography, 
they are perpetrated in the ‘privacy’ of the person’s home) is that they are serious violations of 
the respect that we owe each other, and thus denials (at least implicitly) of the moral status of 
those who are their objects.40 In other cases we may find a starting point in conduct that might 
not be straightforwardly harmful, but that seriously violates the dignity of those subjected to it 
(or taking part in it), even if they freely consent to it. This is true, I think, of ‘dwarf-throwing’, 
and provides the only morally plausible (but still inadequate) basis for the notorious decision in 
the sadomasochist case of Brown.41 In other, typically less serious cases, what is at stake is what 
we would naturally count neither as harm nor as a dignity-violating wrong, but as one kind of 
‘offence’: the kind that involves inconvenience or annoyance, or damage to civic amenities, 
which is covered by regulations concerning noise, littering, minor vandalism of public spaces, 
and the like.42 
 We can note finally that, whilst the Harm Principle is traditionally interpreted as allowing 
criminalization only on the basis of harm to other people, we need not accept that limitation. We 
can see reason to criminalize cruelty to non-human animals, without having to argue that it is 
likely to generate harm to human beings, by recognising such cruelty as a wrong that is our 
proper business.43 
 
 
4. Concluding Comments 
 
I have briefly noted several examples of possible routes to criminalization that do not begin with 
Feinbergian harm to illustrate one of the central points that should be recognised in debates about 
criminalization. We should not assume (as too many theorists tend to assume) that we can create 
a rational and properly limited system of criminal law only if we can articulate a single master 
principle, or set of principles, that provides substantive general criteria by which we can identify 
the kinds of conduct that are in principle criminalizable; the search for such a principle or set of 
principles is doomed to failure (see Duff 2007: ch. 6). Deliberation about criminalization must be 
                                                                                                                                                 
40  Libel and slander provide other interesting examples in this context: English law leaves it to the wronged 
individual to seek redress if she wishes, through the civil courts; it is worth asking why (or whether) it is right 
to see these as being to that degree private rather than public wrongs.  
41  On dwarf throwing see Rao 2011: 226-7, and further references given there; on sado-masochism and R v Brown 
([1994] 1 AC 212), see Bergelson 2007.  
42  On offensiveness see generally Feinberg 1985; Simester and von Hirsch 2005, and 2011: chs. 6-8. 
43  See e.g. Protection of Animals Act 1911. I leave aside here the question of whether harm to self can ever be a 
proper ground for criminalization (see Simester and von Hirsch 2011: chs. 9-10): on the approach sketched 
here, we must begin with the question of what kind of interest a polity should take in its members’ prudent or 
imprudent conduct; to the extent that it can properly seek to dissuade or discourage imprudent conduct, we 
must then ask whether self-harming conduct can count as a wrong that might merit a public calling to account 
and censure. 
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structured by principles that can guide and constrain it; but those principles might be procedural 
rather than substantive, as the principles sketched in this paper are. If we are to criminalize a type 
of conduct, we must show that it falls within the public realm, the civic enterprise, and that it is 
therefore of proper interest to all citizens in virtue of their participation in that enterprise; that it 
constitutes a public wrong within that realm; that it is a wrong that requires the particular kind of 
response that the criminal law provides—one that condemns the conduct and calls its perpetrator 
to public account for it. The question of which kinds of conduct constitute public wrongs is then 
a matter for public political deliberation, which might focus on whether the conduct in question 
is a public matter, or on whether and how it is wrong: given the plurality of values by which a 
liberal polity will define itself, we should expect to find a similar plurality among the starting 
points for the processes of criminalization. 
 One further point is worth noting. I have taken for granted the main structural features of the 
criminal law as we know it—as it functions in, for instance, Britain and the United States (which 
is already to skate over a number of significant differences). In particular, I have so far taken it 
for granted that to criminalize a kind of conduct is to locate it within a distinctive kind of process 
that combines several potentially separable features: a process whose central defining purpose is 
to call people to answer to charges of public wrongdoing, and to answer for that wrongdoing it is 
proved against them; a process which culminates, if the alleged wrongdoing is proved and is not 
exculpated, in a condemnatory conviction and punishment; a process that is controlled not by the 
direct victim(s) of the wrongdoing, but by a public official, who may proceed against the wishes 
of the victim (or decline to proceed despite the victim’s wishes). We can contrast this paradigm 
of a criminal process with a paradigm of a civil process, in which the central aim is to determine 
an appropriate allocation of the costs of some harm that has been caused; in which wrongdoing 
figures only as a condition bearing on the allocation of such costs; in which the outcome is not 
condemnation and punishment, but an award of damages which are proportioned not to fault or 
wrongdoing but to the costs of repairing the harm; and which is controlled by the party claiming 
to have suffered the (wrongfully caused) harm, who can decide whether and how far to pursue 
the case, and whether to insist on the payment of any damages awarded.44 However, if we are to 
think creatively about the enterprise of criminalization, we must also think about ways in which 
those paradigms can be de- or re-constructed. Are there, for instance, ways in which we can keep 
a proper focus on wrongdoing and the need to call its perpetrators to account, but without adding 
punishment as the typical outcome? Are there, for another instance, ways in which we can (and 
should) give victims of crime more control over the criminal process, for instance by giving them 
a formal right to insist on prosecution, or to veto prosecution?45 Advocates of various kinds of 
‘restorative justice’ offer one kind of answer to such questions (although they are often unhappy 
with the focus on wrongdoing that is, I think, an essential feature of anything that is to count as a 
system of criminal law); but we should also be ready to explore other possibilities. 
 It will be evident that what I have offered here is neither a theory of criminalization (would 
that I had one, although I have indicated my doubts about whether one is to be had), nor even a 
sketch of such a theory. My aim has rather been, more modestly, to sketch the kind of approach 
                                                                                                                                                 
44  I do not suggest that either of these paradigms is neatly exemplified in our existing systems, which permit of no 
such clear distinction between the criminal and the civil; but as ideal models they can still serve a purpose.  
45  The German provisions for victims to have a formal role in initiating, requesting, or blocking prosecutions are 
of interest here: see Bohlander 2012: xxx-x. 
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that I think we should take if our aim is to work towards a tenable normative account of the 
conditions under which, the deliberative procedures through which, the ways in which, the ends 
for which, a contemporary liberal polity should criminalize conduct; and to suggest, in particular, 
the shape that a plausible (and plausibly modest) version of Legal Moralism can take. 
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